The institutional approach to political leadership by Elgie, Robert
p Chapter 9 
The Institutional Approach to Political 
Leadership 
Robert Elgie 
Institutions can have a profound impact on the quality of democratic political leadership. 
We are familiar with the differential effects of electoral systems and the basic trade-off 
between representation and governmental effectiveness. We are confident that 
presidentialism is more likely to be associated with lower levels of democracy than 
parliamentarism. Generally, we know that people respond to the incentives created by 
institutional rules. Institutionalism—the study of the effects of political institutions—has 
helped to shape the research agenda over the last 30 years. The popularity of 
institutionalism is derived from its potential to identify theoretically grounded law-like 
propositions that are empirically testable. In so doing, it provides the opportunity to 
identify which institutions are most likely to be associated with better or worse political 
outcomes. With this knowledge, we can shape institutions so as to generate the best 
possible outcomes. 
However, institutionalism is increasingly being challenged. The rise of anti-
foundationalist approaches, such as constructivism and interpretivism, threatens the 
epistemological basis of institutionalism. Even within its own epistemological 
framework, the institutionalist project has been criticized. These criticisms include well-
known claims that institutionalism is overly deterministic, that it can explain stability but 
is poor at explaining change, that institutions are chosen endogenously and, therefore, do 
not have their supposed exogenous effects, and so forth. This chapter, though, focuses on 
a different criticism, namely that institutionalism has failed to produce robust empirical 
results. For instance, while there are good theoretical reasons to support the claim that 
parliamentarism is more likely to generate better leadership outcomes than 
presidentialism, the empirical evidence to support this proposition is decidedly mixed. In 
other words, after nearly 30 years of intensive research and even when judged on its own 
terms, the results of empirical institutional analysis remain highly contested, perhaps 
casting doubt on the merits of this approach overall. 
We begin this chapter by outlining the fundamentals of an institutional approach 
to political leadership and highlighting some of the work that has been produced in this 
area over the last three decades. We then reiterate a fundamental weakness of empirical 
institutional analysis, namely the problem of equifinality and multifinality. This problem 
is the product of the reductionist way in which empirical institutionalist studies are 
normally conducted. In response, we propose a way forward for empirical institutionalist 
analysis. We suggest that an institutional approach to political leadership needs both to 
identify the full set of institutional variables that affect leadership outcomes and to 
specify not only the likely effect of each individual variable on such outcomes, but also 
the likely effect of the combination of institutional variables. Having done so, we could 
then begin to test whether or not there is empirical evidence to support these effects and 
on the basis of such evidence draw more robust conclusions about which institutional 
configurations promote good democratic leadership. 
The Institutional Approach to Political Leadership 
There is now a large body of work that is consistent with the institutional approach to 
political leadership. This approach rests on three assumptions. The first is a permissive 
definition of political leadership. In the 1970s and 1980s those working within the 
behavioral tradition spent considerable time debating the concept of political leadership. 
This work generated hundreds of competing definitions (Burns 2010; Hah and Bartol 
1983: 119–120; Rost 1991: 102). In many cases, the definition was central to the 
analysis. If a person was considered to have met the requirements set down in the 
definition, then s/he was a leader and had exercised leadership. Otherwise, s/he was not 
and had not. The institutional approach to leadership does not rest on any such 
requirements. This approach focuses on the actions of what Edinger (1975) calls 
positional leaders, usually presidents and prime ministers but also legislative leaders and 
leaders at the sub-national level, such as governors and mayors, as well. In this approach, 
these people exercise leadership simply by acting. The net result is that the institutional 
approach to political leadership is primarily defined by the subject of the study—a certain 
class of political actors—rather than by the object—what those actors do. Thus, Helms 
(2005: 3) considers executive leadership1 to be a subset of political leadership studies 
generally and defines it as the “forms of political leadership to be exerted by the office-
holders in the executive branch of a given political system.” For his part, Elgie (1995: 4) 
operationalizes leadership as “the extent to which heads of state and heads of government 
… are able to determine the outcome of the decision-making process.” Here, what is 
meant by being “able to determine the outcome of the decision-making process” is never 
specified. This is because the exercise does not require it. The aim is to explain why 
executive office-holders behave in certain ways rather than to determine whether or not 
they are exercising political leadership on the basis of a checklist of definitional 
requirements. 
The second assumption is that institutions shape the behavior of political actors. 
This element is the sine qua non of any institutional approach. That said, the institutional 
approach to political leadership is almost universally situated in a broader interactionist 
framework. As Sheffer (1993: iv) puts it, “most scholars in this area agree that in addition 
to personal attributes, leadership is intimately related to the fabric of the leaders’ relevant 
societies, to social and political organizations, to established institutions, and to leaders’ 
relations with smaller and larger groups of followers”. Certainly, within this framework 
institutional factors are the primary explanatory variables of interest. However, the 
interactionist underpinning of the institutional approach to political leadership makes this 
particular manifestation of institutionalism relatively immune from the standard criticism 
of institutional determinism (Radaelli, Dente and Dossi 2012). To put it another way, the 
institutional approach to political leadership operates almost always within an explicitly 
probabilistic universe. There is an assumption that institutions generate identifiable and 
regular incentives for executive actors to behave in certain ways. Even so, there is an 
essential contingency to the analysis. This contingency is shared both by those who prefer 
to derive their conclusions from a controlled statistical analysis and by those who prefer 
their leadership studies to be more descriptive. The former wish to avoid the ecological 
fallacy and, therefore, accept individual level deviation from general level institutional 
regularities. The latter wish to emphasize how institutional factors locate or structure 
executive power relations, but acknowledge the impact of idiosyncratic personality and 
local contextual factors. 
The third assumption is that institutional variation creates variation in executive 
leadership. Consistent with the second assumption, leadership is treated as the dependent 
variable. Thus, institutions explain executive behavior, but institutions are themselves 
observed to vary both across space and, less obviously, across time as well. The standard 
way of operationalizing the institutional approach to leadership is via a synchronous 
cross-sectional analysis. The variation in national level institutions is shown to be 
responsible for different general patterns of executive leadership at that level. However, 
the interactionist framework also allows this approach to integrate both diachronic single 
country analysis and time series cross-sectional analysis. Contextual variables, such as 
economic crises, can be treated as exogenous events that challenge existing institutional 
equilibria. Such events create new institutional configurations, leading to new patterns of 
executive leadership. Thus, the interactionist framework not only saves the institutional 
approach from the problem of determinism, it can also rescue it from the equivalently 
standard criticism that institutionalism may be very good at explaining stability but less 
good at explaining change. 
The institutional approach to political leadership comprises a general but 
nonetheless systematic way of studying executive politics. A small sub-set of institutional 
analysis focuses specifically on political leadership. This work provides general 
institutional frameworks for studying political leadership (Elgie 1995; Helms 2005). 
Thus, relying on Peter Hall’s (1986) institutionalist approach, Elgie (1995: 205) argues 
that institutions are collections of rules, procedures, and standard operating practices that 
generate incentives for leaders to behave in certain ways. From this perspective, 
leadership takes place within a given environment, but institutions help to shape the 
leaders’ responses to that environment. Given institutions are relatively invariant over 
time; leaders operating within the same general environment exhibit repeated patterns of 
behavior, creating relatively stable patterns of political leadership. By identifying the key 
institutions within any given environment, it is possible to make generalizations about the 
likely practice of political leadership. So, France and Britain have very leader-centered 
processes. By contrast, Japan and pre-reform Italy had very party-centered leadership. In 
the United States and Germany, leadership was very much the product of multiple 
institutions competing for shared power. Thus, an institutional approach can help to 
identify very general cross-national patterns of political leadership. 
The institutional turn revolutionized the study of politics. It was attractive partly 
because it provided a way forward for post-behavioral positivist-centered scholarship, 
generating testable propositions of observed outcomes. It was also attractive partly 
because it offered additional explanatory tools for more qualitative historicist and 
sociological-based research. For sure, there have always been criticisms of 
institutionalism both from those who start from a different epistemological tradition and 
from those working within the institutionalist paradigm itself. However, the 
institutionalist project remains vibrant. So, what is the problem? The next section outlines 
the problem of equifinality and multifinality. This is a particular problem for positivist 
institutional scholarship and it challenges the research agenda in this domain. 
The Problem of Equifinality and Multifinality 
The fundamental problem with the institutional approach to political leadership is a 
variant of the well-known many variables, small-n problem. The complexity of social life 
is such that outcomes require explanations based on the combination of multiple 
explanatory variables. The number of possible outcomes increases exponentially as each 
additional explanatory variable is included in the analysis (Scharpf 1997: Ch. 1). This 
leads to the problem of equifinality and multifinality. Equifinality refers to the situation 
where the same outcome can arise from different starting points. Multifinality is the 
situation where different outcomes can arise from the same starting point. Even though 
the causal effect of particular institutions may be very well specified and even if there is 
good empirical evidence to support the relationship between the institution and the 
hypothesized outcome, “since the systematic effects of omitted variables cannot be 
controlled for, the results obtained are of doubtful validity” (Scharpf 1997: 42). This is 
not merely a re-expression of the essentially probabilistic nature of institutional analysis; 
it is a statement about how much we can know about the world from the study of 
institutions and institutional interactions (Scharpf 1997: 43). In theory, we can know a 
lot. In practice, though, we can know much less. This means that we have to be very 
careful drawing conclusions about the implications of institutional analysis for good and 
bad leadership. 
We illustrate this point in relation to the debate about the relative impact of 
presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential regimes on democratic performance 
(Shugart and Carey 1992; Cheibub 2007; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Elgie 2011). This is 
a quintessentially institutionalist debate. It is founded on the principle of institutional 
differentiation. Presidentialism is where there is a fixed-term directly elected president, 
where there is no prime minister or where the prime minister and cabinet are not 
collectively responsible to the legislature, and where the legislature serves for a fixed 
term. Parliamentarism is where there is either a monarch or an indirectly elected 
president, where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the 
legislature, and, usually, where the legislature does not necessarily serve for a fixed term. 
Semi-presidentialism is where there is a fixed-term directly elected president, where the 
prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature, and, usually, 
where the legislature does not necessarily serve for a fixed term. Within semi-
presidentialism, president-parliamentarism is where the prime minister and cabinet are 
collectively responsible both to the legislature and to the president and premier-
presidentialism is where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible solely 
to the legislature. Thus, there is variation in the institutional variable of interest. 
There are also good theoretical reasons to suggest that institutional variation has 
an impact on leadership outcomes. For example, there is a long-standing argument about 
the pros and cons of presidentialism and parliamentarism. For example, Juan Linz 
(1990a, 1990b, 1994) identified a number of arguments against presidentialism. Amongst 
other matters, he was concerned with the “rigidity” of presidentialism (Linz 1994: 8–10). 
In presidential systems, the president serves for a fixed term and so does the legislature, 
meaning that the political process “becomes broken into discontinuous, rigidly 
determined periods without the possibility of continuous readjustments as political, 
social, and economic events might require” (Linz 1994: 8). The worry is that, in order to 
introduce some element of flexibility into the system, either the legislature may resort to 
impeaching the president, thus intensifying the crisis, or the president may use his/her 
powers to govern over and above the legislature, thereby threatening the rule of law. A 
further problem concerns the winner-takes-all/loser-loses-all nature of presidential 
elections (Linz 1994: 14–16). There is the fear that the unsuccessful candidates may call 
into question the conduct of the election and the legitimacy of the president’s mandate, 
encouraging their supporters to take to the streets and overturn the result, and democracy, 
by force. 
This judgment about presidentialism has been contested. For example, 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 469) argue that Linz “understated the importance of 
differences among constitutional and institutional designs within the broad category of 
presidential systems and in doing so overstated the extent to which presidentialism is 
inherently flawed.” They argue that “providing the president with limited legislative 
power, encouraging the formation of parties that are reasonably disciplined in the 
legislature, and preventing extreme fragmentation of the party system enhance the 
viability of presidentialism” (1997: 469). In other words, the literature on presidentialism 
and parliamentarism has generated plenty of testable hypotheses relating to the 
institutional effects of the different systems.2 
Finally, there are plenty of studies that examine whether or not there is empirical 
evidence to support the theoretical arguments. This is where the problem starts. In an 
early study, Stepan and Skach (1993) relied on descriptive statistics for non-OECD 
democracies in the period 1973 to 1989 to show that presidential systems were more 
likely to collapse than parliamentary democracies. By contrast, Power and Gasiorowski 
(1997: 137) using a similar method, but in relation to 56 third-world democracies from 
1930 to 1995 found that presidential and parliamentary democracies had virtually 
identifical breakdown rates. More recently, Kapstein and Converse (2008) have examined 
123 democratizations in 88 countries between 1960 and 2004 and found that 
parliamentarism performs worse than presidentialism. In a large-n statistical study of 135 
democratic periods from 1800 to 2004, Maeda (2007) has found that initially presidential 
and parliamentary systems have a similar breakdown rate, but that over time presidential 
systems are more likely to collapse. By contrast, in another large-n study Cheibub (2007) 
has found that presidentialism per se is no more dangerous than parliamentarism, except 
if it is adopted after a period of military rule when it is more likely to collapse. Finally, 
Sing (2010) examined 85 democracies in the period 1946 to 2002 and found that when 
control variables were added presidential democracies were no more likely to collapse 
than parliamentary democracies. In short, there is no consensus as to whether or not the 
pros or cons of a particular regime are supported by the empirical evidence.3 
Undoubtedly, the extreme variation in the findings is partly a result of the choice 
of method and whether or not the findings are based on in-depth qualitative case studies, 
descriptive statistics, or large-n controlled statistical analyses. Whatever the method, the 
findings also partly depend on how democracy is defined, the countries that are included 
in the study, and the time frame that is covered. More than that, even when the findings 
are the product of large-n controlled statistical analyses, the results vary as a function of 
the control variables that are included in the model and the estimation technique that is 
applied. In other words, the extreme variation in the findings is partly a function of the 
state of political science as a discipline. Even though there have been great 
methodological advances in recent years, individual writers are free to make fundamental 
research design choices. Consequently, as a function of data availability, time constraints, 
personal skills, and so on, even studies that are researching the same basic question will 
be based on quite different choices and such choices may lead writers to draw very 
different conclusions about the topic under investigation. 
The problem, though, is more profound. In this example, our variable of interest is 
the type of democratic regime, presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential. Let us 
assume that when investigating the effects of these regimes on democratic performance 
we were working to some agreed scientific standards whereby conclusions were drawn 
solely from large-n controlled statistical analyses, whereby democracy was an 
uncontested concept and, therefore, democratic survivals and collapses could be 
identified unequivocally, whereby the choice of time period was standard, and, therefore, 
the choice of cases was not open to question, whereby an optimal set of control variables 
was identified and a particular estimation technique was agreed, and so on. Let us further 
assume that there were no personality or contextual variables to distort the effect of 
institutions. Finally, let us assume that the results of the statistical analyses showed that 
presidentialism was likely to be significantly more dangerous for democracy than 
parliamentarism. Even under this hypothetical and unrealistic set of conditions, the model 
would still include some cases where presidential democracies had survived and others 
where they had collapsed. It would also include some cases where parliamentary 
democracies had survived and others where they had collapsed. As a result, we would not 
be able to say what would happen if country x were to adopt presidentialism, only what 
would be most likely to happen there. 
The probabilistic nature of the results even under such unlikely methodological 
conditions is a function of the problem of both equifinality and multifinality. From 
different starting points, presidentialism on the one hand and parliamentarism on the 
other, the same outcome will have occurred. That is to say, both presidential and 
parliamentary regimes have collapsed. Equally, from the same starting point, say 
presidentialism, different outcomes will have occurred. In other words, some presidential 
regimes have collapsed and others have survived. What this means is that even though we 
can distinguish between institutions, even though we can specify their causal effects, and 
even if we were to operate under extremely unrealistic conditions of scientific rigor, we 
would still be able to make only a general statement about the empirical effect of the 
institutional variation with which we are concerned. Thus, there is a gap between the law-
like theoretical predictions of institutional analysis and the probabilistic results of 
empirical institutional studies. This gap undermines the institutionalist agenda. 
The problem of equifinality and multifinality occurs because in practice we 
operationalize institutional variation in a very reductionist manner. For example, we 
explore the effect of presidentialism versus parliamentarism, but the explanatory variable 
of interest is merely one institutional variable among many similar institutional variables. 
Other institutional factors interact with presidential and parliamentary institutions to help 
to determine the nature of political leadership. These factors might include the various 
constitutional powers of the president and prime minister, the organization and powers of 
the legislature, the electoral system, and so on. Any of these institutional factors can vary 
in their likely effect on leadership. Presidents can have many, few, or a balance of 
constitutional powers. Legislatures can be organizationally weak, strong, or mixed. 
Electoral systems can represent voter preferences proportionally or disproportionally, and 
so on for each institutional variable. 
Even under the conditions of extreme scientific rigor presented above, to 
understand the impact of presidential and parliamentary institutions on political 
leadership we would need to take account not just of a single institutional variable, but 
also of the interactions between this variable and the full set of institutional variables. If 
these variables were to covary systematically in ways that reinforced the effects of the 
basic institutional variable of interest, then we could discount them and focus solely on 
that variable. For example, let us assume that presidentialism is perilous because it 
generates personalized leadership that can be damaging for the rule of law in a way that 
risks the collapse of democracy. In this event, if presidentialism was always combined 
with institutions that reinforced this weakness, then we could focus solely on 
presidentialism. So, if presidentialism always occurred in countries where the president 
also had many constitutional powers, where the legislature was very weak, where there 
was a highly majoritarian system in which any presidential advantage in the electorate 
was translated into a supportive presidential majority in the legislature, and so on, then 
the basic problem of presidentialism would be reinforced at each stage. In principle, 
completely systematic covariation could eliminate the problems of equifinality and 
multifinality. However, institutions do not covary so systematically. Countries have a mix 
of institutions with varying effects. While some individual institutional effects may be 
mutually reinforcing, others will counteract each other. Political leadership will be the 
result of these multiple interactions. By focusing on a single institutional variable, we 
will still generate only probabilistic results even under highly artificial scientific 
standards. 
Let us illustrate the basic dilemma with reference to semi-presidentialism. First, 
let us take a case of multifinality. By definition, all premier-presidential countries have a 
directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively 
responsible solely to the legislature. Therefore, they have the same institutional starting 
point. However, within this sub-type of semi-presidentialism we still observe huge 
institutional variation and very different leadership patterns. For example, Armenia has a 
relatively strong president, scoring 6 on a 0–9 scale of presidential powers (Siaroff 2003); 
a relatively weak parliament, registering 0.56 on a scale from 0–1 (Fish and Kroenig 
2009); and a mixed plurality-proportional electoral system that has the potential to 
generate majorities that support the directly elected president. Overall, Armenia has 
consistently had a presidentialized form of premier-presidentialism. By contrast, Slovenia 
has a very weak president, recording a score of just 1 on Siaroff’s 9-point scale; a 
relatively strong parliament with a score of 0.75 on the Fish-Koenig scale; and a highly 
proportional electoral system with only a 4 per cent threshold for representation. This 
combination of factors renders Slovenia’s president very weak and makes the prime 
minister the focus of leadership in a system that is nonetheless marked by multiparty 
coalition governments. For its part, Mongolia has a relatively strong president with a 
Siaroff score of 5; as well as a strong parliament with a Fish-Koenig score of 0.85; and a 
mixed plurality-proportional electoral system that can generate single-party majorities. 
Mongolia has experienced periods of cohabitation where there has been conflict between 
the president and prime minister, as well as periods of single-party rule where the prime 
minister has been the dominant political actor. Thus, even by combining just four 
institutional variables we see three very different patterns of political leadership. It goes 
without saying that these patterns are the result of the combination of more than just these 
four variables, but even at this level of detail we witness the potential for multifinality. 
Second, let us take a case of equifinality. Again, by definition, premier-
presidential and president-parliamentary sub-types of semi-presidentialism exhibit 
institutional variation. In the former the prime minister and cabinet are responsible solely 
to the legislature, whereas in the latter they are responsible jointly to the legislature and 
the president. Therefore, they have different institutional starting points. Premier-
presidential Ireland has a weak president, recording a score of 3 on the Siaroff scale; a 
relatively strong parliament with a Fish-Koenig score of 0.66; and a relatively 
proportional electoral system in which the coalition government in now is the norm. In 
Ireland, the head of government is the dominant political actor and, according to 
O’Malley’s (2007: 17) survey, prime ministerial influence scores 6.08, which is just 
below the mean for the 22 countries that he records. For its part, president-parliamentary 
Austria also has a weak president with a Siaroff score of just 1; the legislature is also 
relatively strong with a Fish-Koenig score of 0.72; and there is a proportional-like 
electoral system that has regularly generated coalition governments. In O’Malley’s 
survey, the Austrian prime minister scores 5.42, which is one of the weakest in the study 
but which is also not very far from either the mean or the Irish score. All told, and 
without repeating the caveats in the previous passage, we have two institutional starting 
points but a relatively similar pattern of political leadership in both countries. By 
focusing solely on the institutional variable of interest—the sub-type of semi-
presidentialism—we would expect different outcomes, but with the addition of other 
institutional variables we observe substantively the same outcome. 
Overall, institutional analysis is compelling because it promises to eliminate the 
probabilism associated with institutional effects on political outcomes. True, because 
political leadership is studied in an interactionist framework that includes personality 
factors and exogenous contextual factors, then an institutional approach to political 
leadership cannot eliminate all uncertainty. However, if we could specify institutions and 
their interactions carefully enough, then in theory we could completely eliminate the 
uncertainty related to institutions and drastically reduce the empirical uncertainty in the 
analysis as a whole. In practice, though, even if we discount the impact of personality and 
contextual factors, institutional analysis is imperfect because it is operationalized in a 
highly reductionist manner. For this reason, it generates only very general conclusions 
that are not only very sensitive to basic research design choices, but conclusions that are 
easily contestable because of the existence of often easily identifiable counter-examples. 
The gap between the huge potential of the institutional approach applied to political 
leadership and the empirical limitations of this approach in practice weakens its appeal. 
In this context, the temptation might be to give up on institutionalism altogether. 
However, we argue that, instead, we should work to refine and improve institutionalism. 
We sketch some options for the future direction of the institutional approach to political 
leadership in the next section. 
The Future of the Institutional Approach to Political Leadership 
The problem of equifinality and multifinality is the result of the reductionist application 
of the institutional approach to political leadership and the failure to account for the 
interaction of multiple institutional variables. Here, we identify three elements that help 
to address this problem. We suggest that a combination of these elements will help to 
advance the institutional approach and better identify good and bad leadership outcomes. 
The first element addresses the issue of institutional reductionism. Here, we draw 
upon work that has proposed a general framework for studying political leadership. Such 
frameworks include Cole (1994); Elgie (1995); Rhodes (1997); Gaffney (2003) and 
Poguntke and Webb (2007). For example, Cole (1994: 456) presents an interactionist 
framework for the study of political leadership. Within this framework, there are 
personality factors, such as the leader’s personal characteristics, including political and 
communication skills, as well as both political intelligence and personal attributes e.g., 
courage, ruthlessness, stamina. There are also contextual factors, such as the socio-
economic equilibrium, cultural traditions, and the prestige of the nation in the 
international system. In addition, there are institutional or “positional” factors. Some of 
these variables are specified at an extreme level of abstraction, notably the reference to 
the “constitutional framework.” Interestingly, though, Cole’s list of institutional factors 
also makes specific reference to interactions within the executive, including ministers, 
other leadership contenders, and staffs, as well as interactions with other institutions, 
such as the bureaucracy, parliament, parties, and groups. Certainly, these interactions are 
not specified with any level of precision, but the theoretical logic behind the framework 
is consistent with a solution to the problem that was identified in the previous section. 
These frameworks have the advantage of emphasizing the need to incorporate 
multiple variables when explaining leadership outcomes. As they stand, though, none of 
the aforementioned frameworks specifies the set of institutional variables with either the 
necessary degree of comprehensiveness or specificity.4 However, it would be possible to 
devise an equivalent framework that does provide a more comprehensive list of 
institutional variables and that does specify them more fully. A further limitation is that 
they do not provide any theoretical expectations about the impact of any particular 
variable or about the interaction of any combination of variables. Thus, while the 
identification of a comprehensive list of institutional variables is a necessary condition 
for an institutional approach to the study of political leadership, it is not a sufficient 
condition. 
The second element is to identify the list of institutional variables with a greater 
degree of specificity. To do so, we turn to the recent literature about the executive or 
presidential toolbox (Raile, Pereira and Power 2011; Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power 
2013). This work starts from the observation that in contrast to established theoretical 
expectations (Mainwaring 1993) presidents in Latin America and elsewhere have 
managed to build successful coalitions of support even in the supposedly difficult context 
of multiparty legislatures. To explain why they have managed to do so, this work 
identifies the particular set of tools that presidents have been able to call upon. This work 
examines the presidential use of such tools in the context of a wider set of variables and 
with reference to local factors, suggesting that the toolbox approach is essentially 
compatible with the broader interactionist frameworks identified previously. When 
examining the presidential toolbox, the authors explicitly assume that institutions affect 
political outcomes (Chaisty et al. 2013: 5). Thus, this approach is also compatible with an 
institutional approach to political leadership more specifically. What is more, this work 
also explicitly rejects institutional reductionism. Instead of emphasizing particular 
institutional factors, this work underlines the fact that presidents draw upon “multiple 
institutional tools” (Raile et al. 2011: 326). As Chaisty et al. (2013: 5) state: “rather than 
assume that a single institutional resource permits presidents to elicit multiparty support 
… we assume that presidents have access to a plurality of tools which can be used to 
incentivize coalition formation and legislative support.” This approach also makes it clear 
that the interaction of institutional variables helps to generate leadership outcomes (Raile 
et al. 2011: 325). Thus, the literature on the presidential toolbox is consistent with the 
general requirements of a mature institutional approach to the study of political 
leadership. 
The value added of the presidential toolbox approach lies in the specification of 
the institutional factors that are associated with leadership outcomes. For example, in 
their cross-national study Chaisty et al. (2013: 8) identify five “broad clusters” of 
presidential tools. They are: “agenda power (legislative powers awarded to the president, 
executive decree authority), budgetary prerogatives (control of public spending), cabinet 
management (distribution of portfolios to alliance members), partisan powers (influence 
of the president over one or more coalition parties), and informal institutions (a diverse 
residual category reflecting country-specific historical and cultural factors …)” (Chaisty 
et al. 2013: 8). While these clusters remain “broad,” the variables within each of them are 
specified with a somewhat greater degree of precision than the frameworks identified 
previously. Moreover, other work identifies some of these variables more clearly still. 
For instance, Raile et al. (2011: 325) emphasize the interaction of pork and coalition 
goods for the presidential management of potential partners in the legislature. Coalition 
goods include a party’s membership in the presidential cabinet. For Raile et al. (2011: 
325), these are one-off sunk costs that form the basis of a deal. However, pork is 
distributed on an ongoing basis. The authors propose various ways in which these two 
variables may interact (2011: 326). Overall, the presidential toolbox approach has the 
potential to specify both the effect of individual institutional variables and the 
interactions between those variables. 
The third element is to identify such effects. Here, we draw upon the so-called 
strategic analysis of institutions that was pioneered in France. The origins of this 
approach can be found in the work of Maurice Duverger (Colliard 2010), but its mature 
expression can be found in the work of Jean-Luc Parodi and Olivier Duhamel (Parodi 
1980, 1983, 1984, 1985; Duhamel 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1987). The basic logic behind this 
analysis is the identification of the effect of the institutions under consideration, the 
analysis of the ways in which these institutional effects combine, and the identification of 
the outcomes that flow from them. For Parodi (1983: 999), this approach makes three 
assumptions: (1) Each institution has an a priori theoretical impact on political outcomes; 
(2) The impact of each institution must be situated in a more general institutional context, 
the other elements of which can either reinforce or counteract the original institutional 
effect; (3) A change in any of the elements of the institutional context will alter the 
impact of the original institutional outcome. Thus, this approach is based on the 
assumption that institutions have an impact on political outcomes. However, it avoids the 
problem of institutional reductionism by explicitly placing the impact of any given 
institution in a broader institutional context. Patterns of political leadership are the result 
of the specific combination of these different institutional effects. 
To illustrate this logic, let us take Parodi’s (1984) study of the Fifth French 
Republic. He wishes to explain the emergence of a particular pattern of political 
leadership after 1958, namely a majoritarian presidential system. To do so, he identifies 
five “founding” variables (1984: 630–631). They are: the two-ballot majority electoral 
system for legislative elections; the president’s power to dissolve the legislature; the 
introduction of direct presidential elections; the president’s ability to call referendums; 
and the legislature’s ability to dismiss the government by way of a motion of censure. He 
then proceeds to analyze the individual effect of each of these institutions (1984: 631–
637). For example, he argues that all else equal the direct election of the president is 
likely to lead to the autonomy of the executive; the bipolarization of the party system; the 
nationalization of electoral debate; the personalization of election campaigns; and the 
probability of conflict with other elected institutions. The next step is to analyze the 
combined effect of these institutions. He does so by pairwise combinations. For instance, 
when the type of electoral system for legislative elections is combined with the type of 
election of the president he identifies three different situations. When a majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature is combined with the direct election of the president, 
then there is likely to be the greatest degree of presidentialization. When a majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature is combined with the direct election of the president, 
then there is likely to be some degree of presidentialization. By contrast, when any type 
of electoral system is combined with an indirectly elected president, or, obviously, a 
system in which there is no president, then presidentialization is likely to be absent. 
Indeed, he goes further than that. Focusing solely on the first two scenarios, he identifies 
the effects of the type of electoral system on the different outcomes of the direct election 
of the president (1984: 640). So, Parodi hypothesizes that a majoritarian electoral system 
will lead only rarely to conflict between the president and other institutions, but to very 
severe conflict when it does occur. Conversely, he hypothesizes that a proportional 
electoral system will lead to more regular but less severe conflict. The Fifth Republic 
combines a majoritarian electoral system and direct presidential election. Therefore, we 
would expect to see rare but severe conflict between the president and other institutions. 
The experience of three periods of cohabitation from 1986–1988, 1993–1995, and 1997–
2002 where there was considerable tension between the president and the prime 
minister/government provides basic empirical evidence to support Parodi’s theoretical 
analysis. 
The problems of equifinality and multifinality provide a real challenge to 
empirical institutional analysis. Nonetheless, existing institutional scholarship offers 
clues as to how these problems may be solved or at least mitigated. To do so, various 
elements of this scholarship need to be combined. The insight that multiple institutions 
affect the nature of political leadership is at the core of this exercise. This insight is 
consistent with the very general institutionalist accounts of political leadership that were 
identified in the first section of this chapter. The acknowledgement that the precise 
effects of these different institutions need to be specified very carefully is also core to this 
exercise. This aspect of the research agenda is consistent with the existing body of 
institutionalist work that has identified the specific effects of individual institutions. 
Crucially, though, the problems of equifinality and multifinality can only be properly 
addressed by understanding that outcomes are the result of the combined effects of many 
different institutional interactions. The strategic analysis of institutions is a useful 
heuristic tool in this regard. It shows the value of identifying institutional interactions 
systematically and provides the opportunity for more fine-grained predictions about the 
likely impact of institutional variation on leadership outcomes. In theory, these 
predictions are empirically testable. This combination of elements offers a way of 
generating more reliable conclusions about the effects of institutions on political 
outcomes. True, institutions operate within a broader interactionist framework that 
includes essentially unpredictable personality and contextual factors that add an 
essentially stochastic element to the analysis. Nonetheless, if this type of institutionalist 
approach was adopted, then the variance associated with institutional variables would at 
least be minimized. 
Conclusion 
Over the last 30 years institutionalism has generated a vibrant research agenda. On the 
basis of this work, we are now much better placed to identify the effects of institutional 
rules and to make informed judgments about the consequences of those rules for the 
quality of political leadership. However, there is still a gap between the potential of this 
approach to generate theoretically rich, empirically testable propositions and the actual 
results that have been found. Aside from any foundational or theoretical critiques of 
institutionalism, the failure of institutional analysis to generate robust empirical results is 
problematic and threatens the credibility of the institutional approach generally. The 
absence of definitive empirical findings is caused by the reductionist way in which 
empirical institutional studies are carried out. The focus on the effect of a single 
institutional variable, such as presidentialism or parliamentarism, fails to account for the 
multiple interactions between many such variables. Consequently, even though we can 
make statements about different institutional effects, those statements often remain 
contestable and subject to readily available counter-examples. This situation does not 
weaken the theoretical promise of institutionalism, but it does weaken the practical 
application of institutionalist work. 
In this context, a mature institutionalist approach to political leadership requires 
the acknowledgement that the quality of political leadership is shaped by multiple 
institutions. It rests on the clear specification of those institutional variables and the 
identification both of the likely effect of individual variables, but also, and crucially, the 
effects of the different combinations of those variables. While the impact of personality 
and contextual factors will always render the institutional approach to political leadership 
essentially probabilistic, the comprehensive and coherent specification of multiple 
institutional interactions will minimize the variance associated with institutions 
themselves, thus offering the potential to generate more reliable accounts of politics 
generally and political leadership in particular. 
The obvious objection to this reworking of the institutional approach is that it will 
generate so many institutional scenarios that we will not have enough observations to test 
them. There are two ways to respond to this objection. The first is pragmatic. While we 
may have enough observations to test only a small sub-set of the different institutional 
combinations, if we can generate extremely robust empirical evidence for such a sub-set 
then by extrapolation we could reasonably conclude that the hypothesized effects in the 
unobserved cases would be likely to hold. The second response is more idealistic. The 
alternative to reworking the institutional approach to political leadership in this way is to 
give up on it altogether. Yet, to do so would be to let slip the basic advantage of 
institutional analysis. The strength of institutionalism is that it has the potential to reduce 
the uncertainty of political analysis and generate systematic accounts of political 
outcomes. In this chapter, we have sketched a basis for reworking the institutionalist 
approach in a way that could improve the reliability of the evidence that is used to 
support institutional arguments. If we can do so, then we will be much better placed to 
draw up an agenda for better democratic leadership. The rewards for doing so could be 
great indeed. 
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Notes 
 
                                                
1This term differs from Lodge and Wegrich’s (2012: 214) definition of “executive politics” 
as “the systematic study of the political factor within administrative or 
bureaucratic arrangements, and about the administrative factor in political life” 
and is concerned with a more restricted set of actors than the ones they identify. 
However, it shares with them the idea of a “concentration on a field of study” 
(Lodge and Wegrich 2012: 214), rather than on a particular type of behavior as 
constitutive of the term. 
2The same point also applies to the debate about the pros and cons of semi-
presidentialism. See Elgie (2011: Ch. 2). 
3Again, the same point also applies to semi-presidentialism. For example, Moestrup (2007) 
finds that semi-presidential democracies are no more liable to collapse than 
presidential or parliamentary democracies. By contrast, Cheibub and Chernyk 
(2009) find that semi-presidential is no more or less problematic than other forms 
of government. Elgie (2011) finds strong support for the argument that president-
parliamentarism is more dangerous for young democracies than premier-
presidentialism. 
4Needless to say, none of these frameworks was constructed with the express aim of 
providing a solution to the many variables problem. 
